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Pythagoras’ dictum that ‘all is number’ is well-known. But my impression
is that even practicing mathematicians are often not entirely aware of the thor-
oughness with which we have developed this very idea over the centuries in the
formation of our world-view, from the evolution of the cosmos to the structure
of elementary particles, and even in attempts to describe the ultimate nature of
human consciousness.
Any standard book on cosmology will tell you that the universe is a manifold
with such and such structure. What is a manifold? Nothing but a collection of
coordinate charts, i.e., open subsets of Rn (a collection of n-tuples of numbers)
together with rules for gluing them together. What are the rules? They are
maps, each from a subset of one coordinate chart to a subset of another coor-
dinate chart. What is a map? In the modern view of set theory, a map from
U to V is a subset of U × V satisfying certain conditions. Thus, when U and
V are collections of tuples of numbers, so is a map from U to V . Thus, we see
that a manifold is nothing but a collection of collections of numbers. It is a
rather instructive exercise to try to express in these terms extra structures on
manifolds, such as a metric, or other objects in mathematics whose numerical
nature we tend to forget (actually for good reasons). Going from the large to
the small scale, according to quantum mechanics, the state of the entire uni-
verse is described by a single vector in a large Hilbert which is a tensor product
in a natural way of many other Hilbert spaces. We can completely trace the
evolution of (all objects in) the universe by keeping track of this vector. Such a
vector is of course nothing but an ∞-tuple of numbers.
The most popular models of the brain these days views it as an ensemble of
discrete state spaces, which themselves might be a collection of binary digits.
That is, the state of the brain is a vector in S = {0, 1}N for some large N , with
rules for responding to various external stimuli, and it is hoped that sophisti-
cate mental states can be modelled as certain subsets of S. The problem of
describing consciousness amounts to locating a suitable region in S correlated
to the conscious state. (Of course each factor of S should eventually come with
a label allowing us to interprete the different states.)
In sum, modern science has implemented Pythagoras’ dictum to an absurd
degree, certainly beyond anything he could have imagined. (If we recall his
inspiration, on the other hand, whereby musical notes could be constructed via
suitable combinations of modes of string oscillations, one could argue that his
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view was not very different from that of modern physics.)
Now, as briefly mentioned above, there are good reasons for forgetting that
our models of the world are so dependent on numbers. One is that any given
number or collection of numbers is too restrictive to convey the full richness of
the object we are trying to model. The fact that we can use many different
numbers, depending on our point of view is the genesis of the important idea
of coordinate transformations. Working with coordinate transformations for a
while then naturally leads to the idea that it might be profitable to work with
mathematical models which themselves are not necessarily a priori numerical
in nature. Hence, one now works with, say, abstract manifolds which do not
have a priori coordinate charts, but which only admit coordinate charts, or
vector spaces that do not have an a priori basis. The notion of an abstract set
and its many descendants has undoubtedly given rise to tremendous economy
of description and conceptual clarity in modern mathematics. (According to
Dieudonne, the definition of tensors in physics texts are remnants from the
days when the only sets used in modelling were sets of numbers.) Nonetheless,
it is clear that in practice, even abstract objects are conceptually convenient
substitutes for equivalence classes of numbers.
Given the discussion above, one might expect all mathematicians to be num-
ber theorists, and maybe in some sense they are. However, there is an even more
essential reason why most practicing mathematicians can get by with a rather
naive understanding of numbers and might be better off doing so. This is be-
cause of the extremely useful geometric picture of the real and complex numbers.
Much of the time, it is perfectly reasonable to visualize the complex numbers
as a geometric plane, and base all other constructions upon that basic picture,
oblivious to the fine structure of our objects, pretty much as one can do plenty
of classical physics without worrying about the fact that the macroscopic ob-
jects we are considering arise from the complicated interaction of elementary
particles. Now, my claim is that the role of a number theorist in mathematics
is exactly analogous to the role of a particle theorist in physics. That role being
to probe the nature of the ultimate constituents of the objects that others study
from a far coarser perspective. Thus, in contrast to the continuum picture of the
complex plane, a number theorist is more likely to perceive of each individual
number or groups of numbers in a discrete fashion, and in nested hierarchies
reflecting various complexities, and even attach a symmetry group to each indi-
vidual number. It is not that number theorists avoid the plane model, since it is
also an important tool in much of number theory. It is just that the plane has a
much more grainy and elaborate shape, with many levels of microscopic detail
and structure. Now particle physicists would be viewed as denizens of a baroque
world of their own making if not for the tremendous impact that the theory of
the microscopic eventually has on the macroscopic world, and the hope that
we will someday have a complete picture of how to reconstruct the macroscopic
world from the structure of particles and their interactions. But can we make
similar claims for number theory, that such detailed understanding of numbers
such as the arithmetician strives for leads to some global macroscopic insight
(e.g. for geometry)?
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Affirmative examples are abundant. Recall for example the various impos-
sibility proofs for ruler and compass constructions. There the problems posed
were evidently macroscopic in nature. The resolution had to wait for a mi-
croscopic classification of at least certain classes of numbers in terms of their
symmetry groups: The numbers that can be generated by ruler and compass
constructions are all algebraic numbers with solvable symmetry groups having
elementary 2-groups as the quotients of the composition series. Doubling the
cube, for example, would have involved constructing a number, 21/3 with S3
symmetry group. The impossibility of squaring the circle was eventually under-
stood only with Lindemann’s proof that pi is in fact a transcendental number.
(Recall that a transcendental number is a number with an infinite symmetry
group.)
This classification of numbers by symmetry groups, which is at present an
intractable problem, is still just a beginning of the program to understand how
to go from the microscopic to the macroscopic. It is not hard to ‘find’ all
numbers with simple symmetry groups: For example, a number has symmetry
group Z/2 iff it can be written in the form a + b
√
n where a, b, n are rational.
The numbers with symmetry group Z/3 or S3 are exactly the ones obtained
from the rationals using field operations and cube roots. (It is slightly subtle
to distinguish between the numbers with the two different types.) Among the
deeper results already known are the theorem that a number can be obtained
from the rationals through field operations and radicals iff its symmetry group
is solvable, and the beautiful theorem of Kronecker and Weber that a number
can be written as a finite Fourier series
a =
∑
j
qj exp(2piikj/nj)
with rational coefficients iff its symmetry group is abelian. For example,
√
5 = e2pii/5 − e4pii/5 − e6pii/5 + e8pii/5.
This is a prototype of a deep ‘parametrization’ theorem, which tells us ex-
actly how to generate a class of numbers with an abstract definition. The vague
notion I have introduced of attaining a microscopic understanding of numbers
should be fleshed out by examples of this sort, until a more systematic program
can be formulated.
We note that telling numbers apart by studying their symmetry groups is
very analogous to telling spaces apart through discrete invariants. That is, one
may be able to use geometric intuition to see that two spaces are homeomorphic,
but to prove that they are not homeomorphic requires the use of discrete in-
variants. Similarly with numbers, symmetry groups provide us with convenient
labels with which to unravel their amorphous geometry.
Leaving it to the experts to trace the history of such global ‘applications’ of
number theory, we will move on to some thoroughly modern examples:
SupposeX is a submanifold ofC2 defined by a polynomial equation f(x, y) =
0 with the property that the equation has only finitely many solutions in any
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ring that is finitely generated as a Z-algebra. Then X admits a hyperbolic
metric. (That is, the universal covering spaces of X is the upper-half plane.)
Let X and Y be submanifolds of Pn defined by homogeneous polynomial
equations f1 = 0, . . . , fm = 0 and g1 = 0, . . . , gk = 0 with integral coefficients.
Suppose there is a ‘sufficiently large’ prime p such that f1 = 0, . . . , fm = 0 and
g1 = 0, . . . , gk = 0 have the same number of solutions in every finite field of
characteristic p.
ThenX and Y have isomorphic cohomology groups in each degree. (Grothendieck)
Let X and Y be subspaces of Cn defined by polynomial equations f1 =
0, . . . , fm = 0 and g1 = 0, . . . , gm = 0 and assume:
(1) The same monomials appear with (different) non-zero coefficients in fi
and gi for each i;
(2) The coefficients appearing in f1, . . . , fm are algebraically independent,
and the same for the gi’s.
ThenX and Y have isomorphic cohomology groups in every degree. (Grothendieck)
After stating this theorem, I tried to find some concrete non-trivial examples
with many variables. I found this hard to do because of the paucity of theorems
on algebraic independence of numbers. It is very hard to tell if a given collection
of numbers are algebraically independent. For example, it is not known if e
and pi are algebraically independent! Thus, after millenia of research, even a
number-theorist’s understanding of the structure of numbers is embarrassingly
primitive.
More generally, start with the subspaceX of Cn given by a set of polynomial
equations
f1 = 0, . . . , fm = 0.
Let σ(X) be the space obtained by hitting the coefficients of the the fi’s with
a field automorphism σ of C. Then X and σ(X) have isomorphic cohomology
groups. (Grothendieck)
Let X and Y be simply connected submanifolds of Pn defined by homo-
geneous polynomial equations f1 = 0, . . . , fm = 0 and g1 = 0, . . . , gk = 0 with
integral coefficients. Suppose there are two sufficiently large primes p and l such
that the collections {f1, . . . , fm} and {g1, . . . , gk} are congruent modulo p and
l. Then X and Y have the same higher homotopy groups (Artin-Mazur).
The proof of most of these results are rather difficult, and require the ma-
chinery of arithmetical algebraic geometry in a heavy way. I should mention also
that there are many results whose statements are purely in complex geometry,
but whose proofs require arithmetic sophistication, such as Mori’s remarkable
theorem that a Fano variety can be covered by rational curves, or Batyrev’s
theorem that two birational Calabi-Yau Manifolds have the same Betti num-
bers. Also of interest in this connection is Deligne and Illusie’s arithmetic proof
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of the existence of Hodge decomposition for projective manifolds, a result usu-
ally thought to require hard analysis. Another interesting relation to analysis
occurs in some recent work of Igor Rodnianski, who studies the Schro¨dinger
equation on a torus and finds that the fundamental solution is more singular
at rational times, and in general, the degree of the singularity at a given time
t depends on how well t can be approximated by rationals. It is clear that the
precise structure of numbers makes its influence felt in many different areas of
mathematics.
With this smattering of examples in mind, we will move on to more general
considerations, and spend the rest of our time discussing a theorem coming
from meta-mathematics, which could be viewed as ‘explaining’ the ubiquity of
number theory. There are at least two ways to view such results: One can be
a hard-core mathematician and treat meta-mathematics with the same disdain
that the artist reserves for the art-critic, and declare all meta-mathematical
theorems to be irrelevant to true mathematics. On the other hand, one can
regard meta-mathematics as a bridge linking mathematics to philosophy, taken
in the purest sense, and thence to the eternal and most archetypal questions
of human existence. My own view tends to be somewhere between those two
extremes, but the example I am about to discuss provides such a nice answer
to the title of this lecture that it is hard to resist believing in some genuine
significance it must carry.
We start the discussion with some terminological prerequisites.
A subset S of the natural numbers N is called listable if it can be algo-
rithmically generated. That is, we are requiring the existence of an algorithm
which if allowed to run indefinitely, will eventually have any element of S in
its output set, and no element of N − S. For example, the even numbers are
clearly listable, and any of us can immediately produce a program which will
do the trick. The fact that the prime numbers are listable is verified in many
introductory courses in programming: For any given number, there is an ob-
vious algorithm for checking whether or not it is prime. Then one can easily
design a program which goes through the natural numbers one by one, outputs
a given number if it is prime and moves onto the next number if it is not. When
one speaks of an algorithm in this context, it suffices to understand the word
in an intuitive sense, and take it on faith that it is possible to formalize this
notion in a satisfactory way. But for the morbidly curious, I will state that an
algorithm refers to a program written in the language whose alphabet consists
of the natural numbers and a suitable collection of variables, and a collection of
labels (for commands). The allowable commands are one of three types:
V ← V + 1
V ← V − 1
IF V 6= 0 GO TO L
This seemingly poor programming language has been sufficient thus far for im-
plementing all processes that we feel intuitively to be an ‘algorithm’, and it has
been shown that the algorithms arising from this language coincide with those
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coming from a wide variety of seemingly independent reasonable models of com-
putation. The proposal that this will always be the case, so that me may with
confidence use the above class of programs for the definition of an algorithm is
known as Church’s thesis, and is universally accepted by computer scientists.
Here is a rather subtle example of a listable set: take a polynomial f(t, x1, . . . , xn)
with integer coefficients in n + 1 variables. For any natural number t we plug
it into the first slot, yielding a polynomial of n-variables. We then ask whether
or not the equation
f(t, x1, . . . , xn) = 0 (∗)
has a solution in natural numbers (x1, . . . , xn). Now let S be exactly the set of
values t for which this equation has a solution. It is an easy exercise to check
that S is a listable set (One important thing to realize is that one does not need
an algorithm that figures out the solvability of (*) in order to list S). The sets
that arise in this fashion as a parameter set for solvable Diophantine equations
is called a Diophantine set. Another characterization is to say that a subset of
N is Diophantine if it is the collection of first coordinates to the set of solutions
of a Diophantine equation.
We have just stated that every Diophantine set is listable. Now a remarkable
theorem of Yuri Matiyasevich says that listable sets and Diophantine sets are
in fact one and the same! This is a highly non-trivial theorem. One needs to
shows that given an algorithm that lists a set S of natural numbers, one can
write down a polynomial f(t, x1, . . . , xn) with the property that t ∈ S iff (∗)
has a solution. We call such an equation a Diophantine representation of the
listable set. It is instructive to try out some elementary examples, such as even
numbers, corresponding to the Diophantine equation t−2x = 0, or the squares,
corresponding to t− x2 = 0. The composite numbers can be represented by the
equation
t− (x + 2)(y + 2) = 0
One important example is the collection of numbers that are powers of a fixed
number, say 2. This set is obviously listable, but the equation that we might
naively want to use to express it as a Diophantine set t − 2x = 0 is not a
polynomial equation. It is in fact non-trivial to find a polynomial for this set,
and the study of such exponential equations is a key ingredient in Matiyasevich’s
proof. (In fact, what he shows is that the set of triples a, b, c such that c = ab has
a Diophantine representation, in the sense that there is a three-parameter family
of polynomials f(t1, t2, t3, x1, . . . , xn) for which the set of triples satisfying the
exponential relation is exactly the ‘solvable locus’ in the parameter space. It
had been shown earlier by Julia Robinson that this statement would imply the
general form of Matiyasevich’s theorem.) If one considers the case where S is the
listable set of prime numbers one begins to truly appreciate the uninuitive nature
of the result under discussion. But this theorem turns out to have even more
surprising consequences: One can reduce the most unlikely problems to problems
about Diophantine equations! The key to such a reduction is the possibility of
encoding many collections of mathematical objects in an algorithmic way into
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natural numbers (Go¨del numbering in a loose sense), and translating statements
about the objects into statements about subsets of N.
As an example, consider the four-color theorem, given a computer-aided
proof by Appel and Hakens. It says that for any planar map, four colors, say
red, blue, green, yellow, are sufficient to color all its region so that no two regions
sharing a boundary have the same color. (The map can be four-colored.) We
reduce this problem to number theory as follows: The essence of the argument
is the fact that we can reduce the problem to combinatorics by encoding the
map into labels for the regions together with adjacency relations, i.e., into a
planar graph whose vertices need to be colored in a suitable fashion. Consider
the statement P (n) which says that any map with n regions can be four-colored.
This is obviously an algorithimcally decidable assertion, because the number of
(some obvious equivalence classes of) such maps is finite and the possible ways
of choosing one of the colors for each region is finite. We just have to check
if at least one of the ways works. Thus, we can construct a listable subset S
of N by simply listing all the numbers n for which P (n) is false. Now, let the
equation f(t, x1, . . . , xn) = 0 be a Diophantine representation of S. Then S is
empty, i.e. the four-color theorem is true, iff the Diophantine equation has no
solution. Matiyasevich’s theorem is in principle constructive, and in the case of
the four-color theorem, one can actually write down the Diophantine equation
whose unsolvability is equivalent to it.
Recently, a possibility emerged of reducing one of the most famous unsolved
problems in topology, the Poincare conjecture, to the unsolvability of a Dio-
phantine equation, although this reduction is not quite complete. Recall that
the Poincare conjecture says that an orientable, compact, connected, simply-
connected 3-manifold is actually homeomorphic to the 3-sphere. Since every
compact 3-manifold has a finite triangulation, we need to prove the Poincare
conjecture just for finite simplicial complexes with simplices from dimension 0
to dimension 3. However, one can easily enumerate all these in an algorithmic
way (Exercise). Denote by {s0, s1, s2 . . .} the collection of three-dimensional
simplicial complexes enumerated thus. Out of this, one can attempt to enu-
merate algorithmically exactly the three-dimensional manifolds that satisfy the
hypothesis of the conjecture:
(1) One first enumerates the manifolds by computing the Euler characteris-
tic.
(2) Then for each manifold one computes the homology groups using the
incidence relations suitably and enumerates just those with H0 = H3 = Z and
H1 = H2 = 0.
(3) Now, there is an algorithm for computing the fundamental group of a
simplicial complex as well, in the sense that one can find a finite presentation
for it. So it might be hoped that from the list we have arrived at after step
(2), one would be able to cull out the three-manifolds with trivial fundamental
group. Unfortunately, the process for doing this is unknown at present because
one cannot algorithmically decide from a presentation whether or not a group is
trivial. Nevertheless, the experts seem to believe that such an algorithm should
exist for the presentations arising from triangulated three-manifolds. So let us
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assume for the moment that we have such an algorithm in hand. Then we can
use it to enumerate a collection of simplicial complexes {c0, c1, . . .} which are
exactly those satisfying the hypothesis of the Poincare conjecture.
Now the key point is this: there is an algorithm, due to Joachim Rubin-
stein, which given any finite three-dimensional simplicial complex will deter-
mine whether or not it is homeomorphic to the 3-sphere. Thus, we can go
through the set of 3-d simplicial complexes enumerated above, and put n ∈ S
iff cn is not homeomorphic to the 3 sphere. We arrive thereby at a listable
set S ⊂ N. According to Matiyasevich, there will then be a polynomial such
that f(t, x1, . . . , xn) = 0 has a natural number solution in the xi’s iff t ∈ S.
Thus, provided we can find an algorithm for determining the triviality of the
fundamental group of three-manifolds, the Poincare conjecture can be reduced
to a number-theoretic statement that Diophantine equation in n+ 1 variables
f(t, x1, . . . , xn) = 0
has no solutions in N.
Before drawing conclusions about the meaning of all this, let us consider
finally what is perhaps an even more bizarre consequence of Matiyasevich’s the-
orem: Consider the notion of ‘formalizable theory’. This is a theory made up of
a countable alphabet and a syntax, a countable collection of axioms and rules of
inference. In the early years of this century many leading mathematicians and
philosophers believed that ‘all’ of mathematics is formalizable in this sense, al-
though we have at present rather strong grounds to be pessimistic. In any case,
for any such theory, it is easy to put all the well-formed sentences in 1-1 corre-
spondence with N, i.e., we can number them {s0, s1, s2, . . .}, in an algorithmic
fashion. One can then also generate all the theorems of the theory by applying
the rules of inference in some automatic way to the axioms. That is, the theo-
rems of the theory will give rise to a listable set S = {n ∈ N|sn is a theorem}.
Corresponding to this, we again find a polynomial f(t, x1, . . . , xn) such that
t ∈ S iff f(t, x1, . . . , xn) = 0 is solvable. Thus, a one-parameter family of Dio-
phantine equations captures all we would like to know about the theorems of
our theory. To check whether the 100th sentence in our theory is a theorem,
we need ‘only’ check if f(100, x1, . . . , xn) = 0 has a solution is natural numbers.
As an aside, we remark that these considerations can be used to see that there
is a Diophantine equation for which the existence of a solution is undecidable.
What are we to make of all this? We leave it to the audience to decide for
themselves what Matiyasevich’s theorem says about the role of number theory
in mathematics. It should be admitted in this connection that thus far, no
significant application has been found of this technique of ‘reduction to a Dio-
phantine equation’ to other areas of mathematics. Rather, it is usually invoked
to illustrate the difficulty of the subject of Diophantine equations. In the ab-
sence of more intricate developments from the theorem within the domain of
mathematics proper, the importance to be attached to it will remain a matter
of personal taste. However, in conjunction with results of the sort stated earlier,
involving straightforward applications of number-theoretic insight, it is hard not
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to believe that there is something about number theory that is very fundamen-
tal and all-pervasive within the entire universe of mathematical objects. For
years, I’ve felt the need to deny the popular conception of mathematics that
equates it with the study of numbers. It is only recently that I’m returning to a
suspicion that mathematics is perhaps about numbers after all. It is said that
in ancient Greece the comparison of large quantities was regarded as a very dif-
ficult problem. So it was debated by the best thinkers of the era whether there
were more grains of sand on the beach or more leaves on the trees of the forest.
Equipped now with systematic notation and fluency in the arithmetic of large
integers, it is a straightforward (albeit tedious) matter for even a schoolchild
to give an intelligent answer to such a question. At present, our understand-
ing of the complex numbers is about as primitive as the understanding of large
integers was in ancient Greece. It is tempting to speculate that a precise and
systematic knowledge of the structure of complex numbers (in particular a good
notational system which would reflect arithmetic properties) will eventually ren-
der many problems of seemingly insurmountable conceptual difficulty trivial to
schoolchildren in the far future.
The title of this lecture is obviously a bit of an exaggeration. It is no
more true that everyone ‘should’ delve deeply into number theory than that
a solid-state physicist should have a comprehensive knowledge of mathematics.
A vigorous tension between people who feel the constant need to delve into
fundamentals and those who gaily apply intuitive reasoning is an essential one
for the health of any science. However, I will finish with a personal recollection
of my encounter with the physicist Victor Weisskopf, whose lecture I attended
in my first year of graduate school when I was still contemplating a research
career in mathematical physics. I asked Weisskopf how much mathematics a
physics student needs to know, to which he answered with a smile: ‘More.’ The
general mathematician who has ever wondered how much knowledge of numbers
is necessary for research could do far worse than heed the same advice.
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